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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW WRITING
COMPETITION WINNER
LMRDA TITLE IV'S § 401(e): THE ISSUE OF

"BROAD REACH" IN THE PROCESS OF
GUARANTEEING A REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO RUN

FOR UNION OFFICE*
In drafting the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959' (the Act or LMRDA), Congress reiterated the federal government's responsibility, inter alia, to protect employee rights 2 because of
the substantial effect labor-management disputes can have on interstate
commerce.' Congress also perceived a growing number of instances of
corruption and abuse by unions and employers 4 and declared that legisla* First Place, John H. Fanning Labor Law Writing Competition, Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America, 1993.
1. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1988) [hereinafter LMRDA].
2. Section 1(a) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988), states "[tihe Congress
finds that, in the public interest, it continues to be the responsibility of the Federal Government to protect employees' rights to ... choose their own representatives." Id.
3. Id. The Act provides that:
the relations between employers and labor organizations and the millions of
workers they represent have a substantial impact on the commerce of the Nation;
and that in order to accomplish the objective of a free flow of commerce it is
essential that labor organizations, employers, and their officials adhere to the
highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering the affairs
of their organizations, particularly as they affect labor-management relations.
Id.
4. Id. § 401(b). The LMRDA further states:
The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the labor and management fields, that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures to observe
high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require further and
supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection of the rights and
interests of employees and the public generally as they relate to the activities of
labor organizations, employers, labor relations consultants, and their officers and
representatives.
Id.
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tion was needed to protect the public in the free exercise of these rights.'
In Title IV of the LMRDA, section 401(e), Congress sought to strike a
balance between a union's right to impose "reasonable",6 restrictions on
members seeking to hold office and the member's right to participate in
the election affairs of his union. The question of what type of union
regulation should be considered "reasonable" has produced no clear consensus in the thirty-five years since the LMRDA's enactment. 8 The Department of Labor, empowered through the Secretary of Labor to
enforce section 401(e) rights,9 concedes that the issue is "not susceptible
5. Id.
6. LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e). The statute states in relevant part that
"every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office
(subject . . . to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)." Id.
7. Id.
8. One early commentator, shortly following the Court's ruling in Local 3489, United
Steelworkers of America v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977), correctly noted that the decision
"left the fundamental issue of what constitutes a reasonable candidacy requirement still
undecided." See DORIS B. McLAUGHLIN & ANITA L.W. SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUMGRIFFIN AcT AND UNION DEMOCRACY 33 (1979).
9. LMRDA § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1988) states, in relevant part: "The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days
after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against the labor organization .... "
Id. The Secretary of Labor's enforcement powers, and the willingness of Department of
Labor (DOL) officials to bring suit on behalf of candidates challenging union elections, is
an area of considerable importance and controversy. One author states that, according to
a DOL official with whom he spoke, the Department will bring suit only when no facts are
in dispute between either the challenging or victorious party. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN,
WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 198-200 (1992). Geoghegan relates the following conversation: " 'You mean, if ten people saw Mr. A. steal a ballot but Mr. A. said he didn't, you
wouldn't bring the case?' 'No, there would be a fact in dispute.' " Id. at 200. Geoghegan
calls it a "delusion" to believe that the Labor Department might actually enforce the
LMRDA. Id. Essentially, Geoghegan concludes, the Department "doesn't enforce the
law." Id.; see also Allan J. Topol, Note, Union Elections Under the LMRDA, 74 YALE L.J.
1282, 1285 (1965). Topol stated that one outcome of the LMRDA's enforcement provision,
which also requires that a complaining union member exhaust all internal union remedies
before petitioning the Secretary, is to allow those who break the law "to enjoy its benefits
during the period of litigation." Id. at 1286-87. Coupled with other "traditional delaying
tactics in pre-trial discovery," the effect of the LMRDA's exhaustion requirement may
actually preclude a complainant from receiving effective relief "since terms of local officers
are limited to three years." Id. at 1288. Even after the Secretary has brought suit on
behalf of a complaining candidate, a court can overturn the election only "[i]f, upon a
preponderance of the evidence" it is demonstrated that the violation "may have affected
the outcome of an election." LMRDA § 402(c), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c). This proof requirement precludes many suits from being brought. See GEOGHEGAN, supra at 199. For example, if a union member has been denied her right to observe the counting of ballots because
she has been locked out of the room, how is she to prove that a violation has occurred-let
alone prove that it might have affected the election's outcome? Id. See generally Edgar N.
James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union
Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 293-94 (1978) (analyzing the enforcement
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of precise definition,"'" but rather "turn[s] on the facts in each case."'"
In one form or another, however, nearly all courts have utilized the test
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel
& Club Employees Union, Local 6,12 which stated that candidacy restrictions should be consistent with promoting fair and democratic elections.' 3
Five months earlier, the Court had struck the same balance in Wirtz v.
Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n 4 stating that Congress intended
society's vital interest in protecting union members' rights to participate
in democratic union elections to supersede a union's interest in its own
scheme of Title IV and stating that "the agency and judicial construction of that scheme,
radically compound the problems of non-elite candidates"). See also Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407, 472-529 (1972);
Recent Development, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 745 (providing an in-depth case study analysis of
the Secretary of Labor's exercise of his § 482 enforcement powers).
10. 29 C.F.R. § 452.36(a) (1992).
11. Id. The Department of Labor's regulations cite Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club
Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968), as establishing "general guidelines"
against which a rule may be judged. 29 C.F.R. § 452.36(a). The regulations also provide
five factors to be considered in assessing a qualification's reasonableness:
(1) The relationship of the qualification to the legitimate needs and interests of
the unions;
(2) The relationship of the qualification to the demands of union office;
(3) The impact of the qualification, in the light of the Congressional purpose of
fostering the broadest possible participation in union affairs;
(4) A comparison of the particular qualification with the requirements for
holding office generally prescribed by other labor organizations; and
(5) The degree of difficulty in meeting a qualification by union members.
29 C.F.R. § 452.36(b)(1)-(5).
12. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 492.
13. Id. at 499. In full, the Court stated:
Congress plainly did not intend that the authorization of § 401(e) of "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed" should be given a broad reach. The contrary is implicit in the legislative history of the section and in its wording ....
This
conclusion is buttressed by other provisions of the Act which stress freedom of
members to nominate candidates for office. Unduly restrictive candidacy qualifications can result in the abuses of entrenched leadership that the LMRDA was
expressly enacted to curb. The check of democratic elections as a preventive
measure is seriously impaired by candidacy qualifications which substantially deplete the ranks of those who might run in opposition to incumbents.
It follows therefore that whether the Local 6 bylaw is a "reasonable qualification" . . . must be measured in terms of its consistency with the Act's command to
unions to conduct "free and democratic" union elections.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In analyzing the regulation, which prevented
93% of the union's membership from becoming a candidate for high union office, the
Court found the regulation unreasonable. Id. at 502.
14. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 475 (1968). The
union bylaw in question required members to attend 75% of the union's regular meetings
over a two-year period in order to be eligible to run for office. Id. at 466.
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autonomy.15 The Supreme Court noted in Hotel Employees that Con16
gress did not intend that such restrictions be given "broad reach."
While the Court was unanimous in Hotel Employees,'1 7 a schism developed nine years later. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Local 3489,
United Steelworkers v. Usery18 struck down a union's meeting attendance
requirement' 9 as being too restrictive.2 0 Justice Powell and the two other
dissenting Justices, however, called the Court's ruling an unnecessary intrusion into the internal affairs of the union. 2' In Justice Powell's view, a
union regulation should be held valid when it serves a legitimate union
interest or purpose.2 2
Thus, while the majority's ruling in Steelworkers was intended to resolve discrepancies among the federal circuit courts of appeals as to what
types of union regulations are reasonable,23 several courts since have interpreted broadly the Court's narrow admonition.24 In McLaughlin v.
15. Id. at 475 (stating that "Congress emphatically asserted a vital public interest in
assuring free and democratic union elections [to take precedence over] the narrower interest of the complaining union member"); accord Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery,
429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977); Wirtz v. Local Union No. 125, Laborers' Int'l Union, 389 U.S.
477, 483 (1968), overruled by Hodgson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 403 U.S. 333 (1971).
16. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 499; accord Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 309. The union
bylaw in question in Hotel Employees limited candidacies for the positions of "general
officer, district vice-president or elected business agent to members" presently serving, or
who had previously served, on "either the Assembly or the Executive Board" or who had
served on "'the old Shop Delegates Council.'" Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 500-01
(quoting union bylaw). For a more recent court ruling on a similar provision, see Donovan
v. Local 223, Motor Expressmen's Union, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2518 (W.D. Okla. 1982)
(holding that a union bylaw limiting candidacies to members who have previously served
as officers or shop stewards violates the reasonableness requirement of § 402(e)).
17. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 509. Justice Marshall took no part in the case.
18. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 305.
19. A meeting attendance regulation is usually established by a labor organization to
require that a member physically attend a specified number or percentage of regularly held
meetings within a specified time-period leading up to an election. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 452.38(a) (1992) (suggesting that the validity of such guidelines is to be examined "in the
light of all the circumstances of the particular case").
20. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 310. The Court held that a union's meeting attendance
rule which disqualified 96.5% of all the union's members from seeking union office was not
reasonable.
21. Id. at 314 (paraphrasing Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S.
463, 471 (1968)).
22. Id. at 316.
23. Id. at 307.
24. Within the past six years, both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits handed down
decisions in contradiction to the Supreme Court's admonition that such regulations should
not be given "broad reach." See Department of Labor v. Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers Int'l Union, Local 200, 941 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1991); Brock v. International Org. of
Masters, Mates and Pilots, 842 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988); see also infra notes 107-26 and
accompanying text. For an example of a more stringent application of the Supreme
Court's text, see McLaughlin v. American Postal Workers Union, Miami Area Local #1,
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American Postal Workers Union,25 for example, a district court struck
down as unreasonable a union regulation that prohibited a union member
who had applied for a management position within the previous two
years from running for union office.2 6 According to the court, the
LMRDA clearly states that "the word 'reasonable' [should be interpreted] narrowly so as to afford maximum protection to the purposes of
the Act."27 Yet an almost identical union provision was upheld in 1991
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Martin v.
Branch 419, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,28 which defended the
union's regulation as reasonable because it was consistent "with the Act's
29
command to unions to conduct 'free and democratic' union elections.,
While acknowledging the Hotel Employees/Steelworkers Courts' statement that Congress did not intend the term" 'reasonable qualifications' "
to be given a broad reach,3" the Sixth Circuit focused on Justice Brennan's qualifying language from the Hotel Employees/Steelworkers decisions which provided that the LMRDA "'does not render unions
powerless to restrict candidacies for union office.' "' In Letter Carriers,
the Sixth Circuit found that the union had a strong interest in ensuring
undivided loyalty from its elected officials.32
Adding to the confusion before the courts, there has been no shortage
of challenges to variations of union eligibility regulations. Union bylaws
have attempted to limit candidacies to members who have met attend680 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (striking down a union regulation that prohibited union
members who had applied for a management job within the previous two years from seeking union office).
25. American Postal Workers, 680 F. Supp. at 1519.
26. Id. at 1520.
27. Id. at 1522 (citing Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 309). The Court continued that "[tihis
patently unreasonable limitation of eligibility is exactly what Congress contemplated
preventing in the LMRDA." Id.
28. 965 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1992).
29. Id. at 67 (quoting Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391
U.S. 492, 499 (1968)).
30. Id. (quoting Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 499).
31. Id. (quoting Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 308). Justice Brennan circumscribed the
breadth of interests to be considered this way:
The LMRDA does not render unions powerless to restrict candidacies for
union office. The injunction in § 401(e) that "every member in good standing
shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office" is made expressly "subject to
...reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed." But "Congress plainly did not
intend that the authorization ... of 'reasonable qualifications...' should be given
a broad reach. The contrary is implicit in the legislative history of the section and
in its wording ......
Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 308-09 (quoting Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 499) (alterations in
original).
32. Letter Carriers, 965 F.2d at 66.
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ance requirements,3 3 who are in good standing,34 who have held prior
office,3 5 who have not applied for management positions,36 who are not
retired or older than a certain age,3 7 or who have not been a union member for a required period of time.38 Federal district and appellate courts
have taken a more restrictive approach to some regulations as opposed to
others, creating uncertainty for unions seeking to impose reasonable restrictions and candidates seeking to exercise their democratic rights, as
well as for the Secretary of Labor, upon whom rests a duty of
enforcement.3 9
This Comment examines and analyzes the nuances of post-Steelworkers
approaches taken by circuit and district courts when applying the Hotel
Employees/Steelworkers test to each type of regulation.4" This Comment
then discusses whether the circuit and district courts have strayed too far
from the Supreme Court's command that such restrictions not be given
"broad reach." This Comment next surveys whether justifiable reasons
exist for the courts to have strayed. The Comment then recommends adjustments in the Supreme Court's analysis which, if made, might more
adequately serve the public policy goals that the LMRDA was enacted to
protect. Also, in light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
LMRDA that union elections should be modeled after democratic elections held in the United States, this Comment will analogize, where applicable, various union regulations with provisions of the United States
Constitution that set reasonable requirements to serve in federal office.41
33. See infra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
35. See Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 492.
36. See infra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 9.
40. For a pre-Steelworkers analysis of Court decisions reviewing union candidacy restrictions, see generally, Thomas H. Barnard, Restrictions On the Right To Be A Candidate
And Hold Union Office-The "Reasonable Qualifications" Exception in the Labor-Management Reporting and DisclosureAct, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1239 (1972).
41. Issues surrounding the regulation of candidates seeking union office are particularly significant considering what Professor Jack Metzgar of the Labor Education Program
at Roosevelt University calls "an outbreak of union democracy" throughout the United
States. Richard Greer, Labor Unrest-In the Unions: Dissidents Challenging Leadership,
ATLANTA J.& CONST., Mar. 25, 1993, at 1. "'[T]here are contested elections in local union
after local union ....
Any union incumbent who is running for union election really sweats
it now." Id. (quoting Jack Metzgar). The reporter called this trend a "[g]rass-root rebellion." Id. Susan Jennik, a spokesperson for the Association For Union Democracy, points
to the federal government's takeover of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as a
catalyst for the growth of rank-and-file activism throughout organized labor. See United
States: Unions Face New Reform Movements, INTER PRESS SERV., Sept. 14, 1991 (quoting
Jennik's statement: " '[Just the fact that there are challenges is remarkable. I see a big
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This Comment concludes that while the test struck in Steelworkers has
effectively served the LMRDA's goal of preserving society's and union
members' interests in democratic unions, a more restrictive application of
the Steelworkers test would further promote these societal interests while
more clearly delineating interests of sufficient importance to unions and
union autonomy-the protection of which a union may seek to regulate
internally.
I.

A.

STRIKING

A

BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETING INTERESTS

Society's Legitimate Interest.- "Free and Democratic Union
Elections"

In Glass Bottle Blowers, Justice Brennan stated that because the end
product of labor legislation often reflects political compromise, it is best
to examine the LMRDA's legislative history "in the light of the general
objectives Congress sought to achieve" rather than by attempting to discern a "literal reading."42 Similarly, Archibald Cox in his analysis of the
LMRDA's legislative history caveats that, because a large portion of the
Act was formulated during House and Senate debate and "contain[s] calculated ambiguities or political compromises," one would do better to
look to the "underlying rationale" of the LMRDA's provisions rather
than the exact words utilized in each section to discern its true meaning.43
change among the rank and file people' in a growing number of unions."), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File. For a specific accounting of four elections hotly contested in recent years, see Byron Acohido, Machinists Have Their Say, SEATrLE TIMES,
May 7, 1992, at G1 (discussing the first contested election in 11 years involving Machinist
District Council 751); Kenneth C. Crowe, Cleaner Tries Sweeping Out Union Boss, NEwsDAY, Oct. 13, 1992, at 31 (discussing an immigrant member's crusade to unseat the highest
elected official of Service Employees International Union Local 32B-32J); Michael Flagg,
Union Elects Insurgent Officials to Lead Local, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1992, at B3 (discussing a Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees local union election); Diane Lewis,
Carpenters Leadership Hammers Out a New Era, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1993, at 77
(detailing how one local union, "by a scant 15 votes," ended 30 years of factional control by
electing new leadership); see also James R. Beaird, Union Officer Election Provisionsof the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 51 VA. L. REV. 1306, 1318
(1965) (explaining why securing candidacy rights for union members is vitally important).
The author states that "[diepriving members of the right to run for office takes away both
their chance to govern the union and the benefits that can accrue from an election campaign." Id.
42. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968).
43. Archibald Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 842 (1960). Cox saw the LMRDA's purpose as follows:
The election of officers is the heart of union democracy. The policies of any
large organization must be formulated and administered by a small group of officials. Their responsiveness to the members depends upon the frequency of elections, a fair opportunity to nominate and vote for candidates, and an honest count
of the ballots.
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These sources along with the Senate Report on the legislation, as well
as interpretive court rulings, are clear in stating that achieving "free and
democratic union elections"' 4 was Congress' primary societal goal in enacting Title IV of the LMRDA.4 5 Section 401(e) seeks to ensure that
union members are free to participate in their organizations' democratic
operation and self-government.4 6 Principles governing union election

The LMRDA establishes comprehensive requirements for the conduct of union
elections.
Id. at 842-43; see also Barnard, supra note 40, at 1240 (stating that the Act as "remedial
legislation" was subject to "hard-nosed politicking"). The author traces the LMRDA's
origins to a "Trade Union Democracy" bill submitted in 1947 by the American Civil Liberties Union. See also Benjamin Aaron, The Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 906 (1960). Aaron concluded just one year after the
LMRDA's enactment, that the Act "will justify itself ... if it protects the rights of an
oppressed minority, even at the cost of some disruption of internal union affairs." Id. at
906. Aaron states that calls for federal legislation aimed at supporting union democracy
fell on deaf ears until 1957, when the McClellan Committee began investigating charges of
union corruption and racketeering. Id. at 851-52. The following year, the Kennedy-Ives
bill, which would have strengthened the rights of members to participate in their union,
passed the Senate but was defeated in the House. Id. at 852. The bill sought to avoid
"'rigid governmental controls,' " according to the majority report, because "'labor and
management have considerable capacity to regulate their own affairs.' " Id. at 857 (quoting S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1958)). A series of bills and amendments
regulating labor unions were offered in both the House and the Senate, including a bill
submitted by President Eisenhower during the second session of the 85th Congress. Id. at
853-55. The LMRDA followed on the heels of these bills and was eventually approved as
substitute legislation. Id. at 852.
44. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pt.3, at 20 (1959) [hereinafter SENATE
LMRDA REPORT].
45. Id. The Senate report points out that, under federal labor law, individual employees may not negotiate with an employer when a union has been chosen by a majority of
fellow employees to represent the group in negotiations. Id. Individual employees are
bound by the union contract. Id. Thus:
The Government which gives unions this power has an obligation to insure that
the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the men and women
whom they represent. The best assurance which can be given is a legal guaranty
of free and periodic elections. The responsiveness of union officers to the will of
the members depends upon the frequency of elections, and an honest count of the
ballots. Guaranties of fairness will preserve the confidence of the public and the
members in the integrity of union elections.
Id. In Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528 (1972), the Supreme
Court through Justice Marshall stated that Congress,
having conferred substantial power on labor organizations ... began to be concerned about the danger that union leaders would abuse that power, to the detriment of the rank-and-file members. Congress saw the principle of union
democracy as one of the most important safeguards against such abuse, and accordingly included in the LMRDA a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of
union elections.
Id. at 530-31.
46. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 530-31.
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procedures were to be modeled after those utilized in public elections in
the United States. 47 Thus, under section 401(a)-(i) of the Act, unions are
free to conduct elections without governmental interference so long as
the elections conform to the procedures 48 and principles outlined in the
LMRDA.4 9
B. Legitimate Interests of Unions: Control over Internal Affairs
In Hotel Employees,5" the Supreme Court noted that when Congress
attempted to secure the public's interest in democratic principles through
the enactment of the LMRDA, it balanced the need to enforce those
principles against a union's right to conduct its own internal affairs.5 1 In
instances where a union conforms to democratic principles, the government should not interfere with internal union affairs. 52
This interpretation is supported by the LMRDA's legislative history.
The Senate Report states that the committee handling the bill attempted
47. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 504 (1968).
48. See, e.g., Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964). Justice Black succinctly
summarized the procedures of LMRDA § 401 (a)-(i):
Title IV sets up a statutory scheme governing the election of union officers, fixing
the terms during which they hold office, requiring that elections be by secret ballot, regulating the handling of campaign literature, requiring a reasonable opportunity for the nomination of candidates, authorizing unions to fix "reasonable
qualifications uniformly imposed" for candidates, and attempting to guarantee
fair union elections in which all the members are allowed to participate.
Calhoon, 397 U.S. at 140 (quoting LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e)).
49. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 471 (1968).
50. 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
51. Id. at 496.
52. Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. at 470-71. The Court stated:
[LMRDA's] legislative history shows that Congress weighed how best to legislate
against revealed abuses in union elections without departing needlessly from its
long-standing policy against unnecessary governmental intrusion into internal
union affairs .... [Following debate] there emerged a "general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies,
and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most familiar with
union problems to aid in bringing about a settlement through discussion before
resort to the courts."
Id. (quoting Calhoon, 379 U.S. at 140) (footnote omitted). But see Donovan v. Illinois
Education Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982), where Judge Posner sought to limit the type
of democratic principles reflected by Congress in the LMRDA. Id. at 642. In rejecting a
union's contention that the bylaw in question was inherently reasonable because it had
been approved by a vote of a majority of the union's membership, the court stated: "Plebiscitary democracy is not the theory of the electoral provisions of the LMRDA." Id.
Compare id. with Martin v. Branch 419, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 965 F.2d 61, 65 (6th
Cir. 1992) (undertaking a more limited inquiry in examining a bylaw passed by "democratically-elected members of [a] convention"). The court went on to state that the LMRDA
does not require such an assembly to adopt measures "that a philosopher-king might find
distasteful" nor for the courts to act as "super-delegates" at the convention. Id.
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to take "great care . . . not to undermine union self-government or
weaken unions" in the field of collective bargaining. 3 The committee
recognized that union members are "fully competent" to run their own
union.54 Congress also recognized, however, that the guise of a right to
internal union management could be used to defeat individual members'
rights to participate in union affairs and to further the personal cause of
an entrenched leadership. 5 In those instances, coercive governmental
power must be applied. 6
Similarly, the Department of Labor's regulations relating to the enforcement of section 401(e) recognize union autonomy over its own inter53. SENATE LMRDA REPORT., supra note 44 pt.2, at 7. The LMRDA's Senate Report stated explicitly: "[I]n establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should
be taken not to undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective-bargaining agents." Id. The exact parameters of what union actions and roles the
committee meant to include within the terms "self-government" and "collective bargaining" is important because, implicitly, it defines what is most likely included within a union's
legitimate interests, according to Congress. Hence, a union might justifiably seek to promote these interests as legitimate reasons for enacting restrictive candidacy requirements.
What "role" unions play as agents of collective bargaining can be defined in a variety of
ways. One author suggests that "[tioday, it is widely accepted that collective bargaining is
a union's primary function." Roger C. Hartley, The Framework of Democracy In Union
Government, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 13, 50 (1982). The term includes "attempting to advance the economic welfare of bargaining unit members," the enhancement of employee
job security, and efforts "to modify the work environment to make work psychologically
more healthy." Id. at 52-53. Edgar James also identifies the primary function/collective
bargaining theory. See James, supra note 9, at 250. James notes a second "systematic
approach[es] to unionism," which emphasize a union's role in fostering "industrial peace,
efficiency, and growth" as well as a third purpose of the union in being "responsive to
membership demands above all." Id. at 252-53. Hence, union members, leaders and society-each from its own perspective-may identify the organization's core purpose, or role,
in different ways. When these respective definitions as they relate to a candidacy regulation are in conflict, a challenge is likely to ensue-the legitimacy of which may turn on the
court's perspective.
54. Compare SENATE LMRDA REPORT, supra note 44 pt. 2, at 7 with Aaron, supra
note 43, at 906. Aaron states that "[c]ontrary to the assumptions so often expressed by
Congress, union members are frequently more radical and irresponsible than their leaders
in the conduct of collective bargaining" and predicting that the LMRDA may result "in an
increase of a primitive type of democracy, characterized chiefly by the disregard or overthrow of present leaders and the vigorous pursuit of collective-bargaining demands formulated by local majorities ....

The inevitable result will be more industrial strife, followed

by more restrictive legislation." Id.
55. Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 497; see also Glass Blowers, 389 U.S. at 474 (stating
that an "extensive congressional inquiry showing how incumbents' use of their inherent
advantage over potential rank and file challengers established and perpetuated dynastic
control of some unions" (citing S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958))).
56. See SENATE LMRDA REPORT, supra note 44 pt. 2, at 7; see also Glass Blowers,
389 U.S. at 474 (stating that governmental involvement and supervision of union elections
"reflects a conclusion that union members made aware of unlawful practices could not
adequately protect their own interests through an unsupervised election").
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nal affairs as being "legitimate." 57 Nonetheless, these regulations state
that the union's interest must be "closely scrutinized"5 8 to determine if
members' and society's interest in preserving union democracy should supersede the union's interest.5 9
II.

WHEN LEGITIMATE INTERESTS COLLIDE: WHAT

Is

REASONABLE?

Where a union enacts a restrictive procedure or regulation that defeats
society's and the membership's interest in democratic principles, the
union regulation will be found unreasonable6" unless it is outweighed by
the union's interest in running its own internal affairs.61 The Supreme
Court, however, highlighted the fact that "'Congress emphatically asserted a vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elec62
tions that transcends the narrower interest' " of the union.
A.

Justice Brennan's Command in Steelworkers

Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery63 provided the most recent
57. 29 C.F.R. § 452.35 (1992).

58. Id.
59. Id. The Regulation states in whole:
Qualifications for candidacy.
It is recognized that labor organizations may have a legitimate institutional interest in prescribing minimum standards for candidacy and office-holding in the
organization. On the other hand, a dominant purpose of the Act is to ensure the
right of members to participate fully in governing their union and to make its
officers responsive to the members. A basic assumption underlying the concept
of "free and democratic elections," is that voters will exercise common sense and
good judgment in casting their ballots. In union elections as in political elections,
the good judgment of the members in casting their votes should be the primary
determinant of whether a candidate is qualified to hold office. Therefore, restrictions placed on the right of members to be candidates must be closely scrutinized
to determine whether they serve union purposes of such importance, in terms of
protecting the union as an institution, as to justify subordinating the right of the
individual member to seek office and the interest of the membership in a free,
democratic choice of leaders.
Id.
60. E.g., Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 499
(1968).
61. E.g., Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 310 (1977).
62. Id. at 309 (quoting Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463,
475 (1968) and Wirtz v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 389 U.S. 477, 483 (1968), overruled by Hodgson v. United Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971)); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
63. 429 U.S. 305 (1977). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicting
decisions between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, concerning the meeting attendance rule
of the international union. Id. at 307 n.3. The Sixth Circuit had upheld the union's meeting attendance rule, Brennan v. Local 5724, United Steelworkers, 489 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.
1973), while the Seventh Circuit had struck down the bylaw, Brennan v. Local 3489, United
Steelworkers, 520 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1975), affd sub nom. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 305.
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opportunity for the Supreme Court to interpret when a union regulation
of any nature violates LMRDA section 401(e). 6' The Steelworkers test is
strict and compares the regulation's effect with6 the
Act's purpose-con5
ducting "free and democratic union elections.
In Steelworkers, the meeting attendance rule at issue disqualified
96.5% of the local's members from running for union office by requiring
a member to attend at least half of the union's monthly meetings over a
three-year period to be eligible to seek office.6 6 The Court rejected the
union's justifications for the rule and struck it down as being in violation
of section 401(e). 67 To the Court, the fact that the regulation did not
further the cause of an "entrenched" leadership was of no consequence.68
Additionally, the Court found it unpersuasive that the rule was designed
to encourage members to attend meetings.6 9 The Court rejected the
64. In International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 498 U.S. 466
(1991), the Court reviewed the legislative considerations underlying the enactment of the
LMRDA and § 401(e), but ultimately determined the case based on "the reasonableness of
the candidate's request [under § 401(c) of the LMRDA] rather than on the reasonableness
of the Union's rule [under § 401(e)]." Id. at 475. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens
did, however, quote at length from Hotel Employees. Id. at 474-75.
65. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 309 (citing Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 504).
66. Id. at 307. Out of an estimated 660 members whose activities placed them in good
standing, only 23 members were eligible to seek elected office because of the rule. Id.
(citing the findings of the court of appeals in Brennan, 520 F.2d at 516). Nine of the 23
members eligible were current officers. Id. at 307-08. Because members were required to
attend half of the monthly meetings held over a three-year period, members who wished to
become a candidate were required to protect their viability at least 18 months before the
election. Id. at 308. Sufficient reason to run for office might not appear until closer to the
election, the Secretary of Labor argued. Id. Thus, the Secretary stated that the effect of
the rule was to prevent democratic elections from occurring. Id.
67. Id. at 311. The Court noted that interest in running for office likely peaks shortly
before an election is held; those members whose interest is piqued for whatever reason less
than 18 months before the election would be prohibited from running. Id. The Court
found that a union member's ability "to oust incumbents in favor of new leadership" was
impaired by this requirement. Id.
68. Id. at 309 (stating that the LMRDA was enacted to combat "abuse by benevolent
as well as malevolent entrenched leadership" (citing Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 503)).
Moreover, the Court stated:
The reasons for leaderships becoming entrenched are difficult to isolate. The
election of the same officers year after year may be a signal that antidemocratic
election rules have prevented an effective challenge to the regime, or might well
signal only that the members are satisfied with their stewardship ....
[For this
reason], Congress chose to guarantee union democracy by regulating not the results of a union's electoral procedure but the procedure itself.... Procedures that
unduly restrict free choice among candidates are forbidden without regard to
their success or failure in maintaining corrupt leadership.
Id. at 311-12.
69. Id. at 312. The Court pointed out, in fact, that the rule had failed to achieve that
desired goal. Id. On average, 47 of the local's approximately 660 members attended each
meeting. Id. at 312 n.8.
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union's argument that the rule was reasonable because, by his or her own
efforts, a member could ensure that he or she was not denied an opportunity to seek union office.7" Finally, in the face of so many union members
being precluded from officer candidacy, the Court rejected as unsubstantial the union petitioner's interest in ensuring more qualified leaders.7 In
light of the interests posited by the union and its restrictive effect on
union democracy as evidenced by the percentage of union members disqualified by the rule, the Court struck down the bylaw because of its restrictive effect on democracy.72
Statistical considerations are a strong factor that may lead the Secretary or a court to determine that a regulation is unreasonable.7 3
Although no court has ever applied a per se effects 74 analysis of section
401(e), 75 at some point, "the oppressive nature" of a union's qualification
restriction becomes "evident., 76 Or, as stated in Steelworkers, that point
70. Id. at 310. The union had attempted to differentiate the meeting attendance rule
at issue here with that struck down in Hotel Employees on the ground that the union members in Steelworkers, through their own efforts, preserved their viability as future candidates. Id.; see supra note 11. "Even examined from this perspective ... the rule has a
restrictive effect on union democracy." Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 310. The eligibility rule is
to be judged "not by the burden it imposes on the individual candidate but by its effect on
free and democratic processes of union government." Id. at 311 n.6.
71. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 312. According to the Court, Congress considered democratic elections, "unfettered by arbitrary exclusions," to be the best means for ensuring that
qualified leaders were elected. Id. "Pursuing this goal by excluding the bulk of the membership from eligibility for office, and thus limiting the possibility of dissident candidacies,
runs directly counter to the basic premise of the statute." Id.
72. Id. at 313-14.
73. Id. at 310.
74. A "per se" effects rule would examine the statistical percentage of members eliminated from becoming a candidate for union office and, whenever the rule disqualifies a vast
majority of the membership, judge it unreasonable. See id. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting);
see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142 (6th ed. 1990).
75. But see Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 315 (stating that the majority nonetheless came
close to applying a per se analysis in this case). As Judge Edwards explains, the issue is
more than just semantical. See Harry T. Edwards, The Coming of Age of the Burger Court:
Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court During the 1976 Term, 19 B.C. L. REV. 1
(1977). A percentage-based per se test would have the effect of striking down all union
restrictions when a certain percentage of union members are disqualified, no matter what
union interest was cited in support of the rule. Id. at 57. With respect to meeting attendance rules, in particular, a per se rule would essentially strike down every attempt by a
union to regulate in this way because of "[tihe low level of interest in ordinary, day to day
union business." Id. at 58. As Judge Edwards states, therefore, it "is not hard to fathom"
why a majority of Justices in Steelworkers declined to utilize such a test. Id. at 57.
76. Wirtz v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962, 965-66 (E.D.
La. 1966). The court struck down restrictive regulations that required a candidate to be a
member of the parent local, to have paid monthly dues "on or before the first day of each
month during the year preceding," and to have been a member in good standing for at
least five years prior to the election. Id. at 964. Only 104 of the local's 3137 members
satisfied the union's candidacy requirements. Id. at 965.
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is reached when the "result obviously severely restricts the free choice of
the membership in selecting its leaders. '77 At that point, the balance has
been tilted in favor of the complaining union member, and the regulation
must be struck down.7 8
Dissenting from the Court's holding in Steelworkers, Justice Powell was
disturbed by the majority giving "controlling weight" to the percentage
factor.79 Justice Powell and two other Justices would have upheld the
meeting requirement rule because it was not inherently or predictably
restrictive; the rule only disqualified the vast majority of members after
they failed to protect their own viability.8" In addition, the dissent differed with the majority's analysis, which did not consider the interests
cited by the union to be legitimate.8"
Subsequent courts have often given statistical analyses persuasive, if
not determinative, weight. While one pre-Steelworkers court found a regulation to be unreasonable when more than 87% of a union's member77. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 310 (majority opinion).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell admitted that the majority's opinion did not adopt a per se effects rule but complained that, by relying too heavily on the
Court's decision in Hotel Employees, "it comes close to doing so." Id. He differentiated
the rule at issue in Hotel Employees from that at issue in Steelworkers because the rule
does not work to entrench union leadership. Id. That effect was "predetermined," and a
"purposeful and inevitable effect of the structure of the [prior office holding] rule itself," in
Hotel Employees when the union's leadership enacted the requirement. Id. at 315-16. Justice Powell found that this was not so in regard to the meeting attendance rule in Steelworkers. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Judge Edwards believes that a broader area of philosophical disagreement is at
play here than that evidenced on the face of the majority and dissenting opinions. See
Edwards, supra note 75, at 58-59. Justice Powell, in voting to uphold the meeting attendance rule, sought to preserve stability in labor-management relations through the established union leadership. Id. at 58. "Justices Powell, Stewart and Rehnquist fear [that
striking down the rule] may tend to disrupt industrial stability by putting more locals into
the hands of militant leaders who will be much less compromising in their economic demands." Id. at 59. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, sought to "make it easier for temporarily aroused union members to displace established leadership." Id. at 58. Judge
Edwards' analysis elaborates on the distinctions drawn by Edgar James in detailing three
different schools of thought as to what core functions unions play in society and members'
lives. See James supra note 53. If Judge Edwards is correct, the dissenting Justices in
Steelworkers interpret § 401(e)'s "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed" guidelines
to grant union leadership with a wide latitude of discretion because unions' primary role is
to stabilize labor-management relations. LMRDA § 401(3), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1988).
They are concerned with union autonomy only to the extent it promotes that goal. Cf
Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that whether a sufficient nexus
exists between the meeting attendance rule at issue and the goals it seeks to promote "is a
'judgment call' best left to the unions themselves.") But cf Edwards, supra note 75, at 59
(indicating that the Steelworkers majority sees the statute's purpose founded in "openingup" the union political process and "encouraging democracy within the union").
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ship was kept from participating in an election,8 2 a post-Steelworkers
court upheld a similar union regulation that prevented at least 74% of the
union's members from seeking union office when the union was forced to
do so by law.8 3 Most courts in recent decisions, however, have struck
down regulations preventing 80%, 8" and even as low as 60%, of a union's
members from running for election. 5 One court recently let stand a
union regulation that effectively prohibited one out of six members from
running for union office.8 6
B. Meeting Attendance Requirements
It is in the area of meeting attendance requirements that courts appear
to have most consistently followed the Steelworkers directive that union
regulations not be given "broad reach." Just three years after Steelworkers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Marshall
v. Local 1402, InternationalLongshoremen's Ass'n 87 struck down a union
regulation requiring that members attend at least one meeting each
month for twelve consecutive months to be eligible to seek union office.8 8
The regulation differed from that examined in Steelworkers in at least two
material respects. First, rather than having to attend eighteen monthly
union meetings within a three-year period, members were only required
to attend twelve union meetings, one each month, within twelve months;
second, the Longshoremen's regulation provided a liberal excuse provision-a member need only call into the local union's office prior to the
82. See Wirtz v. Local 9, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 980, 982 (D.
Colo. 1965), affd, 366 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 96 (1967). The union
regulation required that members intending to seek union office must have paid all union
quarterly dues prior to the preceding year's due date. Id. at 982. Both the district and
appeals courts struck down the regulation because it excluded approximately 87% of the
membership from running for union office. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments as
moot. Operating Engineers, 387 U.S. at 96.
83. See Donovan v. Local 500, Transp. Workers Union, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2499
(S.D. Fla. 1982). A union of 418 members was required by statute to hold elections in one
year. Within that period, the union acquired more than 1200 additional members through
an airline merger. Those 1200 members were not eligible to run for union office in the
upcoming election because of a union regulation requiring 12 continuous months of good
standing.
84. Marshall v. Local 1402, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 617 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
85. Hodgson v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 18, 440 F.2d 485 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971).
86. Dole v. Aluminum, Brick, and Glass Workers Int'l Union, Local 200, 941 F.2d
1172 (11th Cir. 1991).
87. 617 F.2d 96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
88. Id. at 97. The union conducted two such regular meetings monthly. Id.
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meeting to obtain an excused absence. s9 Accepting that the burden on
members was slighter to some degree than that imposed upon members
in Steelworkers, the court nonetheless was unpersuaded that the rule
withstood analysis.9" In the court's view, the liberal excuse provision actually undermined any legitimate purpose that the rule might have hadto ensure a more informed membership. 9' Moreover, the fact that 93.7%
of all members were ineligible to run for union office because of the regulation rendered it undemocratic. 9 The reasoning set forth in Steelworkers controlled.9 3
In Donovan v. Pennsylvania Optical Workers Ass'n, a Pennsylvania

federal district court also refused to give "broad reach" to a union's regulation that required members to attend at least two-thirds of monthly
union meetings held within a twelve-month period.9 4 No attendance
records beyond the memories of current union officers were kept, 95 and
89. Id. Members were considered to have attended if they had been excused from the
meeting ahead of time. Id. To be excused, members were required to contact the union's
office before the meeting was held. Id. Moreover, every union member received attendance credit for the period's first two months. Id. at 97 n.1. In contrast, the district court in
an unreported opinion granted summary judgment to the union after finding these factors
adequate to distinguish the rule from Steelworkers. Id.
90. Id. at 98. Quoting Steelworkers, the court rejected the union's argument that the
burden placed on members was minimal compared to Steelworkers: " '[T~his argument misconceives the evil at which the statute aims. We must judge the eligibility rule not by the
burden it imposes on the individual candidate, but by its effect on free and democratic
processes of union government.' " Id. (quoting Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery,
429 U.S. 305, 310-11 n.6 (1977)).
91. Id. The court opined that "the only purposes for the rule having evaporated, we
are left with a rule which serves no demonstrable purpose, but which, on the other hand,
significantly limits eligible candidates and imposes a substantial adverse effect on the democratic process." Id.
92. Id. at 99. The court stated:
[W]here the legitimate purposes served by the rule are weak at best, where a
potential candidate must formulate his intention to run ten months in advance of
the election, and where the impact of the rule is to render ineligible 93.7% of the
union membership, we hold that the "the antidemocratic effects of the meeting
attendance rule outweigh the interests urged in its support."
Id. (quoting Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 310).
93. Id.
94. Donovan v. Pennsylvania Optical Workers Ass'n, 603 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
Another union rule required every candidate to have been a member of the union for at
least five years. Id. at 194. The Secretary initially sought to strike down this provision until
it was discovered that every member of the local union met the requirement. Id. at 195 n.1.
95. Id. at 196. According to the district court's factual findings, the union's recording
secretary reconstructed attendance lists by "poll[ing] all the current union officers." Id. at
194. Although no records of attendance were recently kept, in previous years the union
had used a sign-in sheet to keep track of membership at meetings. Id. Considering these
facts, the Court found it "incredible" that the union would argue in support of the bylaw's
validity. Id. at 196. The "collective recollection of current officeholders" to " 'reconstruct'
the attendance records" was unreliable in light of testimony demonstrating one witness'
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more than 80% of the union's members were disallowed from running for
office because of the union regulation.9 6 The court rejected the union's
contention that the rule legitimately sought to ensure candidate familiarity with union issues.97 Citing the holding in Steelworkers, the court
stated that free elections adequately guaranteed that goal.98
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Doyle v. Brock9 9 struck down a rule that required members to
attend six of twelve monthly union meetings within a twelve-month period."° The rule eliminated 97% of its members from having the opportunity to seek office.'
Citing at length from Steelworkers, the court held
the rule's antidemocratic effects outweighed the interests posited in support of the regulation by the union. 10 2 The court rejected the Secretary of
Labor's explanations for refusing to bring suit in the matter. 10 3 The court
noted that, although Steelworkers did not apply a per se analysis, the fact
inability to recall even the date of a recent meeting, let alone the names of "all twenty-four
members who attended meetings that took place over one year ago." Id.
96. Id. Of the local's 150 members, just 16 (excluding eight present officers) were
eligible to become candidates. Id. at 194. According to the district court's factual findings,
meetings were not held on a regular date each month, but were held irregularly. Id. At
times, a full month would pass without a single meeting being held. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This case was actually the third of three actions
brought by the plaintiff against the Secretary of Labor. In Doyle v. Brock, 632 F. Supp. 256
(D.D.C. 1986), suit was brought because the Secretary chose not to pursue a complaint of a
union member. Id. at 258. The Secretary was ordered to supply the court with a supplemental accounting as to why enforcement of the Act was not sought. Id. at 263. In Doyle
v. Brock, 641 F. Supp. 223 (D.D.C. 1986), aftd, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the district
court held that the Secretary's reasons for not enforcing the Act were deficient. Id. at 227.
The court ordered the Secretary either to enforce the Act or appeal the District Court's
decision. Id.
100. Doyle, 821 F.2d at 780. Only members who signed the meeting's registrar were
credited for being present at the meeting. Id. The complaining union member claimed
that, although he did not always sign the registrar, he had attended other union meetings
but received no credit. Id.
101. Id. at 784. A vast percentage of the union's membership was prohibited by the
rule from becoming a candidate in spite of excuse provisions providing that members could
receive a meeting attendance credit by contacting the union's executive board within 30
days after the meeting was held. Id. at 780 n.1.
102. Id. at 783. The rule should be judged " 'not by the burden it imposes on the individual candidate but by its effect on free and democratic processes of union government"
and whether "the anti-democratic effects of the ... rule outweigh the interests urged in its
support.' " Id. at 784-85 (quoting Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305,
310 (1977)) (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 784. The Secretary argued that, in contrast to the rule in Steelworkers, the
rule at issue in Doyle-requiring attendance at just six meetings over a 12-month periodwas easier to meet. Id. He further argued that the excuse provisions at issue in Doyle
were more liberal than those at issue in Steelworkers. Id. Both arguments were rejected
by the court of appeals. Id.
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that 96.5% of members were discriminated against received at least
" 'controlling weight.' ,14 Weighing the rule's antidemocratic effects
against the interest posited by the union-encouraging membership parstruck down the rule because it did not
ticipation-the court of appeals
05
serve a valid union interest.1
Dissenting, Judge Silberman noted that Steelworkers, at least implicitly,
left open the possibility that a union bylaw that did not strictly limit a
potential candidate's ability to run for union office shortly before an elec10 6
tion might be found reasonable.
B.

Good Standing: Dues Payment

In contrast to interpretations of section 401(e) in the area of meeting
attendance requirements, two cases subsequent to Steelworkers relating
to restrictive dues payments seem to indicate that some courts have
strayed from the command that union regulations not be given broad
reach. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Brock v. International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots"°7 reviewed a union regulation that disqualified union members from seeking
office when they failed to pay quarterly union dues on a timely basis for
104. Id. at 785 (quoting Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting)). The
court of appeals derided the Secretary for arguing that" 'the Local's requirement... is not
stringent or uncommon among unions, nor is the impact unusual and that [i]t is probable
that many, if not most, existing meeting attendance rules would be found unreasonable if
tested by impact alone.'" Id. at 784 (quoting Supplemental Statement of Reasons at 15)
(alterations in original). To those arguments, the court responded:
We do not understand why the typicality of a requirement that has a large antidemocratic effect somehow makes it a reasonable requirement under the
LMRDA. "Whether a particular qualification is 'reasonable' within the meaning
of § 401(e) must... 'be measured in terms of its consistency with the (LMRDA's)
command to unions to conduct "free and democratic" union elections.' "
Id. at 784 n.5 (quoting Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 309 (quoting Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club
Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968))).
105. Id. at 784. The court noted that Steelworkers itself is cited approvingly in the Department of Labor's regulations. Id. at 785. Many of the interests posited by the Secretary
in support of the union bylaw were rejected in Steelworkers, and so they must also be
rejected here. Id. at 785-86.
106. Id. at 788 (Silberman, J., dissenting). " '[Member interest in changing union leadership is likely to be at its highest only shortly before the election.' " Id. (quoting Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 311). Judge Silberman suggested that a bylaw requiring a member to
attend six meetings in 12 months "might stand on surer footing" and might adequately
secure a member's right to run for union office because members with an interest in running would have more time to decide before being precluded by the bylaw. Id. The distinction, Judge Silberman believed, robbed the majority of the "precise and binding
precedent" necessary to overturn the Secretary of Labor's decision not to bring suit under
the LMRDA. Id.
107. 842 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
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twenty-four months prior to being nominated for office.' 08 The court rejected the Secretary of Labor's claim that the provision violated section
401(e). ° 9 Examining the rule's antidemocratic effect, the court of appeals upheld the district court, which found that only 10% of all union
members were disqualified by the rule. 10 The court of appeals noted
that no evidence existed that the rule was enacted to benefit an entrenched leadership or that it disqualified a large percentage of members. 11 The district court had found the members' failure to pay dues
was not a result of conditions beyond their control, such as seasonal unemployment. 11 2 The court also noted that the elections were "vigorously
did exist for members who were outside
contested"' 3 and that waivers
14
the country or who were ill.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied a
similarly broad standard in Department of Labor v. Aluminum, Brick &
Glass Workers International Union, Local 200.115 One out of six union
members was disqualified from seeking office and voting because of their
failure to pay strike assessment fees, which eliminated them from the
union's good standing rolls. 1 6 To run for union office, a person had to
108. Id. at 71.
109. Id. at 73. The Secretary argued that the bylaw was unreasonable because no excuse provisions existed by which a member could maintain a condition of good standing.
Id. at 71. The court rejected this interpretation of reasonableness, and accused the Secretary of applying a "per se rule, without reference to the circumstances of the particular
union." Id. at 72.
110. Id. at 73
111. Id. (stating that the rule did not "detract[ ] from the union's democratic process,
either by operating to the advantage of an entrenched leadership, or by disqualifying a
majority of the membership from holding office"). The rule disqualified 700 members
who, but for the good standing requirement, would otherwise have been qualified to seek
union office. Id.
112. Id. Had seasonal employment conditions made payment of dues difficult, the
court might have considered that factor in judging the regulation's negative effect on union
democracy. Id.; see also Beaird, supra note 41, at 1322 (citing Wirtz v. Local 9, Int'l Union
of Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 980 (D. Colo. 1965), affd, 366 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1966),
vacated, 387 U.S. 96 (1967)). Beaird points to conditions in the maritime industry, with
"cycles of substantial unemployment," as one industry where a bylaw, which otherwise
might seem reasonable, might be struck down by a court as unreasonable. Id. at 1322-23.
113. Masters, Mates and Pilots, 842 F.2d at 73.
114. Id.
115. Department of Labor v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, Local 200, 941 F.2d 1172
(11th Cir. 1991).
116. Id. at 1179. Fifty members of the union, Local 200 of the Aluminum, Brick and
Glass Workers International Union, were engaged in a strike against the Muscle Shoals
Minerals Company in Tuscumbia, Alabama. Id. at 1174. The international union's bargaining committee voted to assess a $25 weekly strike fee on 200 of the local's members
employed at the Reynolds Metals Company in Listerhill. Id. The fee would be assessed
until the strike had ended. Id. Because some members were to pay the strike assessment
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have been a member in good standing for the prior thirty-six months." 7
In the subsequent election, nominators and candidates were disqualified
because of the regulation.' 1 8 While the court found the situation "troubling"' 9 because the defect could not be cured in the months leading up to
candidate nominations, 120 nonetheless it assumed that members, who
were provided with a copy of their union's constitution before joining,
knew the union's rules on candidate eligibility. 12' Although the court
noted that candidates received no notice of the consequences of not paying the strike dues, it did not believe that the union's failure to provide
22
notice had a substantial antidemocratic effect on the election.
Unlike the Masters, Mates and Pilots court, the Eleventh Circuit
quoted the reasoning in Steelworkers-including Justice Brennan's
"broad reach" admonition.1 23 But the court also focused on Justice Brennan's statement that section 401(e) " 'does not render unions powerless
to restrict candidacies for union office.' ,124 The court stated that an "important factor" to consider in determining the reasonableness of a regulation was its "impact on the election.' 1 25 Although a change in the
election's outcome might have occurred if all members eliminated from
participation had voted against the victorious candidate, the court noted
the number excluded from nominating or being candidates was unlike
those associated with bylaws struck down in other instances.1 26
fee through a check-off system, which was not in place until two weeks after the strike had
begun, Reynolds forwarded just $75 of the $125 that would eventually be due. Id. The
strike lasted five weeks. Id. Some 400 members never paid the full amount. Id. at 1175.
According to the union's constitution, members who fell more than two months behind in
dues payments and other obligations would not be considered members in good standing.
Id. Four nominations for union candidacy were declared invalid because of the constitutional bylaw and two union members filed a complaint. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. Of the four nominations voided because of the regulation, two members were
disqualified because their nominators did not meet the union's good standing criteria. Id.
at 1175 n.6. Two other members were disqualified based on their own failure to maintain
their good standing due to the strike assessment provisions. Id.
119. Id. at 1179 (stating that "the issue of exclusion based on the strike assessment [did
not become] certain [until] . . . the months before the nominations [; by then], it was too
late to cure the defect").
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1180.
122. Id. The court found: "Although [the candidates] did not receive specific notice of
the consequences of default, which the voters did, we cannot say that their exclusion based
on the failure to pay a strike assessment within a certain time period had such an antidemocratic effect on the election that a new one is warranted." Id.
123. Id. at 1177.
124. Id. (quoting Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 308 (1977).
125. Id. at 1179.
126. Id. (stating that the percentage of members eliminated were "not of the magni-

19941

LMRDA Title IV's § 401(e)

D. Management Job Applications
Federal courts have split on the issue of whether a union bylaw that
prohibits members who have sought management positions within the
company from seeking union office for two years thereafter is reasonable.127 In McLaughlin v. American Postal Workers Union,'2 8 a federal
district court struck down the union bylaw. 1 29 The court specifically cited
Steelworkers for the proposition that one goal of section 401(e) was to
prevent the entrenchment of union leadership.13 ° With that in mind, the
court derided the union for limiting union candidacy to those members
who shared a single philosophy of union governance. 3 ' According to the
court, the union demonstrated no legitimate interest in preventing one
who has applied for a management position within a two-year period
from holding office.' 3 2 Such a provision, the court found, prevents the
full exercise of union democracy. 33
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
reviewing an identical union bylaw in Martin v. Branch 419, National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers,3 found the prohibitive bylaw to be a reasonable
exercise of union autonomy. 1 35 Citing Steelworkers and Hotel Employtude usually associated with the substantial anti-democratic effect of unreasonable qualifications.") Id.
127. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
128. 680 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
129. Id. at 1522. The court characterized the bylaw as a "patently unreasonable limitation of eligibility [and] exactly what Congress contemplated preventing" through enactment of § 401(e). Id. The candidate, seeking the office of clerk craft president, was not
prevented from seeking office; he was removed after he had been elected. Id. at 1520. The
losing candidate protested the election based on the union restriction as stipulated in the
union's constitution. Id. The removed candidate was aware of the union's rule as a candidate but chose to run anyhow. Id.
130. Id. at 1522.
131. Id. The union argued that the position of clerk craft president required a member
who would not be subject to a conflict of interest. Id. at 1521. A candidate who applied
for a management position within the stipulated period of time might be incapable of representing rank-and-file members in negotiations with management. Id. The court rejected
this argument. Id. at 1522. The court called it a "natural function of the nearly universal
desire of self-advancement" that an employee would apply for a management position. Id.
The union's theory would preclude any member with goals of advancing to management
from representing the union as clerk craft president. Id. Such grounds for disqualification,
the court found, were so "speculative" as to be "patently unreasonable and, in fact, disingenuous." Id. Further, the court analogized that "entrenching oneself [as an officer] and
entrenching only those who share one's specific philosophy of union management" is the
type of conduct that the LMRDA was enacted to prevent. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.(stating that the regulation "unnecessarily impinges upon the 'broadest possible participation in union affairs' ").
134. 965 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1992).
135. Id. at 65. The court stated:
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ees, the court noted that the regulation in question would not eliminate a
substantial percentage of members from running for union office. 13 6 After examining the record of the union's convention during which the bylaw was enacted, the court determined that it was not enacted at the
insistence of an entrenched leadership. 137 Finally, the court stated that it
found the reasoning of the district court in American Postal Workers
Union to be unpersuasive.138 The court concluded that the regulation
was not inconsistent with the LMRDA's command, as interpreted in
Steelworkers, " 'to conduct "free and democratic" union elections.' ,131
E. Restrictions Imposed upon Retirees
Two federal district courts have passed judgment on union bylaws that
attempted to restrict candidacies for union office to members who have
not retired. In both cases, the courts stringently applied the Steelworkers
reasoning.
In Donovan v. Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers, 4 ' the United States Dis[T]he Landrum-Griffin Act was intended, first and foremost, to promote democracy. Democratic assemblies often adopt measures that a philosopher-king might
find distasteful, just as they often fail to adopt measures that a philosopher-king
would embrace without hesitation. Our role, as we see it, is ... [to determine]
whether the choice made by the democratically-elected members of the convention can be defended as 'reasonable.' We have little doubt that this particular
choice can properly meet that standard.
Id.
136. Id. The Secretary of Labor believed that only a small, albeit unstated, percentage
of members were affected by the bylaw. Id.
137. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court examined transcripts from the union's
recent constitutional convention, which indicated that the union's national leadership had
actually opposed the regulation when initially offered. Id. The proposal actually emanated
from a delegate, which according to the court was met with support from other delegates.
Id.
138. Id. at 61, 66 n.3. Still, the court went on to imply that the adoption of the regulation, in light of types of candidates being restrained from participating as officers in the
union, was unwise. "[T]he unions [referring both to the letter carriers and the postal workers organizations] would have been better advised to reject these measures. [The plaintiff],
for example, appears from his application form to be the sort of individual who would
make a fine union officer." Id. at 65.
139. Id. at 67 (quoting Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305,
390 (1977) (quoting Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S.
492, 499 (1968))). The court further stated:
Where a union adopts a qualification for office that may reflect a conflict between
the interest of rank-and-file union members in participating fully in the operation
of their union and the interest of an entrenched union leadership in perpetuating
its own control, the statutory phrase "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed" should be interpreted, if possible, in such a way as to vindicate the former
interest in preference to the latter.
Id. at 64.
140. 613 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
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trict Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee struck down a bylaw that
prohibited retirees from seeking union office. 14 ' The court rejected the
union's argument that retired members would be more likely to lose interest in union affairs and thus would be less likely to run the union effectively. 142 Noting that the Supreme Court addressed a nearly identical
concern in Steelworkers, the district court stated that the LMRDA's provisions were the best means of ensuring the election of qualified leaders. 143 Members were capable of making that determination at the ballot
box."' The bylaw "is strongly at odds" with the goal of free and democratic elections, the court concluded, determining that the plaintiff's candidacy might have altered the election's
results. 4 5 The court ordered the
1 46
local union to conduct new elections.
Similarly, in Dole v. American Federationof State, County, and Municipal Employees, 4 7 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected a union bylaw that restricted high union office to union
members who were younger than sixty-five years of age. 4 8 The union
defended the bylaw on two grounds. First, the union stated that the regulation ensured that the composition of union leaders would be similar to
the composition of the membership. Second, the regulation affected only
a small portion of union members. 1 49 The Secretary of Labor challenged
the regulation because she believed that union members could decide for
themselves whether a candidate of any age was capable of leading the
141. Id. The sheet metal worker challenging the rule retired in 1982. Id. at 608. Nearly
two years later, the plaintiff ended his retirement and began working again. Id. The complainant petitioned the union's general president for an interpretation of the union's constitutional provisions relating to eligibility, and the union's response declared his status as a

former retiree prohibited him from holding office. Id. Although the union's constitution
specifically denied retirees the right to run as a candidate, it made no specific mention of
members who "'unretire.' " Id. at 609.
142. Id. The union argued that retired members would "have the potential of losing
interest" in union matters and, therefore, would be less likely to serve as effective officers.
Id.
143. Id. at 610 (paraphrasing language from Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery,
429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977)).
144. Id. The court stated that, "the goal of the LMRDA is to permit the union membership to determine whether a candidate is a good leader." Id. at 609. The court observed that "[t]he Supreme Court noted that the congressional purpose was modeled after
the assumptions governing the general political system," which " 'assumes that voters will
exercise common sense and judgment in casting their ballots.' " Id. at 610 (quoting Wirtz
v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 499 (1968)).
145. Id. at 610.
146. Id. at 611.
147. 715 F. Supp. 1119 (D.D.C. 1989).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1120.
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union.150 While the Secretary failed to demonstrate numerically how
many members were adversely affected by the bylaw, the court stated
that the magnitude of the effect was not at issue. 15 1 The more important
issue was whether every member in good standing within the union had
the opportunity to run for union office, pursuant to the command of section 401(e) of the Act.' 52 Citing Steelworkers, the court stated that the
union's regulations were not to be given broad reach. 53
The court found no connection between a person's age and his or her
ability to run a union, particularly in light of federal laws protecting
against age discrimination. 5 4 Moreover, the court found no connection
between a person's age and the likelihood that corruption might occurone of the ills that the LMRDA was enacted to prevent.' 55 A new elec150. Id. The Labor Department argued that such a broad exclusion was unnecessary,
and that "members are competent to choose, by their votes, to throw out those officers
who are 'unrepresentative' of the union electorate." Id.
151. Id. The union argued that only 2.8% of its members, retirees, were affected by the
bylaw. Id. But the court responded, "it is not the magnitude of the effect at issue, but
whether or not the election conforms to § 481(e)'s requirement that 'every member in good
standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to § 504 of this title
and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed).' " Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 481(e)
(1988)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1121.
154. Id. A union may not enact bylaws that are inconsistent with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Id. at 1120 n.1 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 452.46). Compare this
case with Donovan v. Laborers' International Union, 683 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1982), where
a similar competency bylaw was struck down by the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1105. The
bylaw attempted to limit candidacies for the local union's office of secretary-treasurer to
members considered " 'competent to perform the duties of the office.' " Id. at 1102 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 482(e)). One criteria measuring competency in the bylaw was that candidates for office must be literate. Id. at 1104. The court struck down the bylaw because it
was "vague" and did not give "notice of the specific standards" required to potential candidates. Id. at 1103. The court compared competency requirement to a minimum age or
length of union membership requirement, positing that such an age requirement could be
"applied with the precision and certainty necessary to ensure it is 'uniformly imposed.'"
Id. at 1104.
155. American Federation, 715 F. Supp. at 1121. The union pointed out that the complainant served 18 previous years as a union officer. Id. Therefore, the union argued that
the bylaw promoted a major purpose of the LMRDA-preventing the entrenchment of
officers in union office. Id. The court responded to this argument by stating that:
rooting out entrenched authority per se was not Congress' goal, though it has
become a shorthand for it. Congress' intent was stated in the statute ... and is
evidenced in a legislative history focused more on corrupt leadership that entrenches itself by excluding others. Viewed in this light, the restriction makes less
sense, as there is certainly no automatic connection between age and corruption,
and unlimited tenure may be dealt with by appropriate bylaws limiting length of
service in office.
Id. (citing Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 497-99
(1968)).
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tion, under the Secretary of Labor's supervision, was ordered by the
court.1 5 6

F.

Union Membership Requirement

In Donovan v. Sailors' Union,157 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reviewed a union bylaw that prevented union members with less than three years of experience from running for union office.' 58 Utilizing the stringent test set out by Steelworkers and Hotel
Employees, the court found the regulation to be unreasonable and a violation of section 401(e). 15 9 The union attempted to justify the bylaw by
arguing that the rule guaranteed that candidates would be familiar with
union issues and problems. 6 ° The court rejected that contention because
Congress clearly intended that the framework of democratic elections,
and union members choosing within that framework, was the best means
of protecting those interests. 16 1 The court held that the rule violated the
intent of the Act and was contrary to the Department of Labor's regulations. 162 Consistent with other courts, the Ninth Circuit found that such
1 63
regulations are not to be given broad reach.
III.
A.

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-A REASONABLE MODEL?

Constitutional Restrictions That Do Not Impede Democracy

Given that Congress plainly intended union elections to be modeled
after general political elections that occur in the United States, it is logical
to examine union election restrictions in light of the restrictions that the
Constitution of the United States places on candidacies for the elected
offices of representative, senator, and President." 6 Analogies will be
156. Id.
157. 739 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir.), corrected, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2512 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
158. Id. at 1428.
159. Id. at 1429. The court found that the bylaw was inconsistent with the purposes of
the LMRDA. Id. "Qualifications that unduly interfere with a free choice of candidates are
at cross-purposes with the Act and therefore are unreasonable." Id.
160. Id. The court called it "desirable" that candidates for union office are familiar
with the membership and the issues of concern. Id. Nonetheless, Congress asserted that it
should be assumed that union members will exercise good judgment in casting their votes.
Id.
161. Id. at 1429-30.
162. Id. at 1430.
163. Id. at 1429.
164. The broad outlines of a framework for this analysis is set out by Barnard, supra
note 40, at 1278-79. As Barnard suggests, parallels will be drawn by examining "the underlying rationale" behind constitutional requirements and union bylaws, rather than "literally" applying such standards. Id. at 1278.
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drawn, where appropriate, with post-Steelworkers cases discussed above
in an attempt to discern indices of reasonableness that union members,
union leaders, and the Secretary of Labor might more clearly rely upon in
65
challenging or implementing union bylaws.1
To run for the office of President, the Constitution 1 66 requires that a
person must (1) be a citizen of the United States, (2) be at least thirty-five
years of age, and (3) have been a resident of the country for at least fourteen years. 67 To run for the House of Representatives, the Constitution 168 requires that a person (1) be at least twenty-five years old, (2) be
an inhabitant of the state he or she has chosen to represent, and (3) have
been a citizen of the United States for at least seven years. 169 Finally, to
serve as a Senator, the Constitution 170 states that (1) a person must be at
least thirty years old, (2) an inhabitant of the state he or she has chosen to
71
represent and (3) a citizen of the United States for at least nine years.1
By the Constitution's very words, these regulations were considered by
our Founding Fathers to be reasonable prerequisites and requirements to
serve in federal office. Had these requirements been considered inconsistent with the goal of achieving representative democracy, the Founding
Fathers would not have included them. Not every person who is a citizen
of the United States can run for political office under the restrictions. It
is a numerical given that a certain percentage of United States citizens
are necessarily eliminated from the pool of potential candidates for each
of these offices by the Constitution's age requirements. More important,
however, is to analyze the types of citizens that the Founders chose to
eliminate from its pool of potential leaders and to ask why.
165. Id. at 1279.
166. U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 5.
167. Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the United States Constitution states:
No Person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution shall be eligible to the office of Presi-

dent; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained
to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the

United States.
Id.
168. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
169. Article I, section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution states: "No Person
shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and

been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." Id.
170. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
171. Article I, section 3, clause 3 of the United States Constitution states: "No Person
shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty years, and been nine
years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of
that State for which he shall be chosen." Id.
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1. Why an Age Requirement?
First, the Constitution eliminated younger voters from the pool-those
under the age of twenty-five for the House, age thirty for the Senate and
age thirty-five for the Presidency. The Founders seemed to believe, generally, that persons of a certain age would bring a certain amount of experience and responsibility to federal office.' 7 2 The Founders further
believed that experience was an important factor in securing the "Blessings of Liberty."1'73 It should be noted, however, that life expectancy in
the late-1700s was considerably shorter than it is today; thus, the age
minimums expressed by the Founders are higher relative to that period's
life expectancy, than they are today. Therefore, one might hesitate to
apply too literally the constitutionally stated age requirements in a late
twentieth century context;1 74 a person who was thirty-five years of age in
the late eighteenth century, for example, had lived a substantially higher
percentage of his or her lifetime than one who is thirty-five years of age
today.

175

The constitutional requirement not only eliminated natural-born chil172. Discerning the intent of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, convened on
May 5, 1787, and dissolved on September 17, 1787, is problematic. See generally WILLIAM
PETERS,

A MORE

PERFECr UNION

77, 88-89, 147-48 (1987). Discussions over the age re-

quirement took place at several different stages of the Convention over the five-month
period. Id. at 77. Dissolving itself into a Committee of the Whole that would later make
recommendations to the full Convention, for example, the Convention initially voted to
have no minimum-age requirement for members of the House while setting a minimumage requirement of 30 years for Senators. Id. Meeting on June 21, 1787, the full Convention reviewed the Committee of the Whole's recommendations. George Mason of Virginia
spoke out forcefully in favor of imposing an age requirement for members of the House,
stating:
"I think it absurd that a man today should not be permitted by the law to make a
bargain for himself and tomorrow should be authorized to manage the affairs of a
great nation
Congress has proved a good school for our young men. It may be so, for anything I know, but if it is, I choose that they [rather than the nation] should bear
the expense of their own education."
Id. at 88-89 (quoting George Mason). The Convention agreed and voted, seven states to
three, to set a minimum age requirement for the lower House at 25 years. The specific
wording of Article I, section 3, clause 2 was approved on August 8, 1783. Id. at 148.
173. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
174. Barnard seems to suggest that age is an irrelevant factor to consider in examining a
union bylaw since "[p]resumably, if the individual is old enough to shoulder responsibilities
of work, he should also be able to participate in leadership if his fellow members deem him
worthy." Barnard, supra note 40, at 127. The more troublesome issue in regard to age,
however, is not a minimum-age requirement in order to seek union office, but maximum
age limitations. See supra notes 140-56 and accompanying text. The lack of constitutional
limitations in this regard, therefore, may very well be relevant.
175. The average age of delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was 42. See
CHARLES L. MEE, JR., THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE 149 (1987).
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dren, but also citizens with actual voting rights, from the potential pool of
candidates for elected federal office. 1 7 6 Therefore, an analogy can be
drawn that the Founding Fathers did not consider the right to vote in an
election commensurate with the right to run for office. Voting rights are
not equal with candidacy rights, according to our Constitution. If age
(namely experience) was considered a reasonable requirement by our
forefathers within a democratic framework, it seems that a union should
compobe permitted to require some sort of minimum-age/experience
177
nent within its own candidacy regulations.
2. Why Residency and Citizenship Requirements?
To run for federal office, our Constitution states that a person presently
be an inhabitant of the state (in the case of senator and representative)
that he or she wishes to serve, and have been a citizen of the United
States for a certain period of time. 1 78 By requiring a person to be an
inhabitant of the state he or she seeks to serve as well as a citizen of the
United States, the Founders sought to assure a candidate's familiarity
with regional and national concerns as well as to ensure undivided loyalty
from people serving in our government. 179 Appropriately, the length of
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
177. See supra note 154 (discussing court ruminations and the Department of Labor's
regulations relating to age and competency requirements). Indeed, DOL regulations permit unions to impose minimum-age requirements but prohibit a maximum retirement age.
29 C.F.R. § 452.46 (1992) (stating that "[a] labor organization may establish certain restrictions on the right to be a candidate on the basis of personal characteristics which have a
direct bearing on fitness for union office," such as a minimum-age requirement).
178. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (setting forth the constitutional requirements to run for office).
179. The inherently discriminatory nature of these restrictions did not escape the notice
of delegates. See generally PETERS, supra note 172, at 150-51. In particular, considerable
debate surrounded the conceptualization and drafting of the Constitution's citizenship requirement. Id. at 150. The Committee of Detail had proposed a four-year citizenship requirement for persons seeking to serve in the Senate. Id. On August 8, 1787, delegates to
the Constitutional Convention debated at length the committee's recommendation. Id.
Governor Morris of Pennsylvania sought a vote to increase the citizenship requirement to
14 years. Id. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, a person of Scottish decent, rose to point out
that he and others like him-actual participants in the drafting of the Constitution-would
be precluded by the requirement from holding office. Wilson called the provision " 'degrading discrimination'" and a "'mortification.' " Id. at 151. Although Governor Morris'
resolution was defeated, the citizenship requirement was preserved fully and, indeed, increased to nine years. Id. Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania also rose in opposition to
the Morris proposal, remarking:
"[Iln every other country in Europe all the people are our friends. We found in
the Course of the Revolution that many strangers served us faithfully-and that
many natives took part against their Country. [I]t is a proof of attachment which
ought to excite our confidence . .. ."
MEE, supra note 175, at 243 (quoting Benjamin Franklin).
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the residency requirement increases in correlation to the importance of
the office sought-from seven years for representative, to nine years for
senator, to fourteen years for President.18 °
B. Post-Steelworkers Analyses
Viewed through the myriad of divergent holdings, the courts since
Steelworkers appear to have ruled inconsistently. However, it becomes
clear that a court's willingness to give a union regulation broad or narrow
reach, as demanded by Justice Brennan in Steelworkers, has depended
significantly upon the nature of the regulation challenged.
1. Meeting Attendance Requirements: A Very Short Leash
The federal courts of appeals have applied the Steelworkers analysis
most strictly to union attempts to impose meeting attendance requirements on members. 8' This is precisely the type of regulation the
Supreme Court considered in Steelworkers. Although the scope of the
union's attempt to regulate employee candidacies has changed, arguments put forth by unions in support of the rule have not. 182 Nor has
courts' unwillingness to uphold this type of regulation.
Consistent with Steelworkers, the Fifth Circuit in Longshoremen's rejected the union's argument that the meeting attendance rule ensures that
members who seek office have at least a minimal understanding of union
issues and activities. 183 The court's reasoning was consistent with Steelworkers, where the Supreme Court stated that democratic elections were
the best means of preserving the union's interest in ensuring that quali1 84
fied leaders are elected to office.
The purpose of the rule as posited by the union in Longshoremen's,
Doyle, and Steelworkers, however, does not seem unlike the constitutional provisions requiring citizens to obtain a level of familiarity with
180. Therefore, if the Framers of the Constitution thought it reasonable to require candidates for certain federal offices to have some level of familiarity with the regional concerns of citizens, it seems that a union should be able to require a similar level of
familiarity for its elected offices. Again, the Department of Labor's regulations, pointing
to continuous good standing and prior membership restrictions, seem to indicate that such
an interest would be legitimate. See 29 C.F.R. § 452.46 (1992).
181. See supra notes 87-106 and accompanying text (discussing court opinions regarding
union elections).
182. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
opinion in Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977))
183. Marshall v. Local 1402, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 617 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). This argument, however, is not explicitly stated. Rather, the
restriction apparently attempts to serve this interest through the meeting attendance
requirement.
184. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 312.
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local, state, or national issues in order to represent adequately fellow citizens in office. For citizens seeking to serve in the House of Representatives, the line is drawn at seven years of residency and twenty-five years
of age. A union also must be able to draw a distinction in terms of the
experience required of its members in order to run for leadership positions. In Doyle, Judge Silberman stated in dissent that the union regulation crossed the line separating an unreasonable familiarity argument
from its reasonable counterpart.18 5 Silberman believed the difference between an eighteen-month and a twelve-month meeting attendance requirement was significant enough to justify its reasonableness. 1 86 The
187
majority disagreed, however.
Ironically, making a meeting requirement rule easier to satisfy is unlikely to save the bylaw. In Longshoremen's, three judges pointed out
that the insertion of liberal excuse provisions in its meeting attendance
regulation, rather than saving the bylaw by making it less difficult to fulfill, actually "undermine[d] the [regulation's] only legitimate purposes" 188-ensuring that candidates are informed. The court discussed
whether a regulation containing a liberal excuse provision-notice by
means of a premeeting phone call to the union hall-achieved its intent
of ensuring a more informed membership. 1 89 In that form, the court
stated that the rule "serves no demonstrable purpose, but ... imposes a
substantial adverse effect on the democratic process."' 910
In short, when unions attempt to pass meeting attendance requirements in any form, courts have kept unions on a very short leash-grant185. See Doyle v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., dissenting).
186. Id. Judge Silberman stated: "Implicitly at least, the [Steelworkers] Court ...suggested that an attendance requirement that took operative effect only shortly before an
election might stand on surer footing .... Absent precise and binding precedent, the court
lacks adequate grounds to reject the Secretary's interpretation of the statute as capricious."
Id. Judge Dooley, in Goldberg v. Amarillo General Drivers Union, 214 F. Supp. 74 (N.D.
Tex. 1963), described the line between reasonable and unreasonable restrictions as the
following:
It is true enough that a union organization has the right to exercise proper discipline of members and prescribe conditions which may be tests of good faith or
designed for tokens of interest in the welfare of the union, such as an extended
period of membership, or regular attendance at meetings, and, of course, the
union to survive must have authority to impose dues and take measures to effect
the regular and reliable receipt of such income, but there must be a line drawn
somewhere between moderation and extremism ....

Id. at 79-80.
187. Doyle, 821 F.2d at 779.
188. Marshall v. Local 1402, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 617 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
189. See supra note 91.
190. Longshoremen's, 617 F.2d at 98.
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ing very little discretion to the organization. It is not entirely clear at
what point, if any, a union would stand on surer footing in enacting a
familiarity requirement. The least stringent requirement struck down by
any court of appeals since Steelworkers was the six meetings in twelve
months requirement rejected by the court in Doyle. Whether a bylaw
that requires members to attend one, two, or three monthly meetings
within a twelve-month period would be upheld is the only remaining gray
area that courts have not yet faced.
2.

Good Standing and Dues Payment: Disturbing Rationalizationsof
Restrictive Rules

In Masters, Mates and Pilots, the court upheld union regulations requiring that members be in good standing, as measured by their prompt payment of quarterly union dues over a twenty-four month period,19 1 giving
the regulations broad reach.' 92 On the face of the Fourth Circuit's opinion,1 93 however, no interests in support of the regulation were expressed.1 94 It is implicit, perhaps, that a union has a vital interest in
preserving and presiding over its own economic integrity. 95 A counter
argument to this is that a union has a variety of means effectively to regulate dues payment from members by methods that would be less likely to
impede the democratic process of union governance. Alternatively, one
could argue that the twenty-four month time period serves the same purpose as residency and citizenship requirements in the Constitution, which
is to ensure candidate familiarity with local concerns.' 9 6
The court in Masters, Mates & Pilots apparently felt that the latter interest outweighed any antidemocratic effects that the bylaw might have
had on the union's election process. The court criticized the Secretary of
Labor by pointing out what the union bylaw did not do.' 97 It did not
disqualify a vast percentage of union members from participating in
union elections.' 98 Further, referring to Doyle, the court implied that the
191. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 107-14.
193. See generally Brock v. International Org. of Masters, Mates and Pilots, 842 F.2d 70
(4th Cir. 1988).
194. Id. at 72-73. Instead, the Fourth Circuit focused on differences between the bylaw
examined and that reviewed by the Court in Steelworkers. Id.
195. See James, supra note 9, at 252. Arguably, according to one "systemic approach to
unionism," if unhealthy financially, a union might be ineffective in its role of "foster[ing]
industrial peace, efficiency, and growth." Id.
196. See supra notes 169, 171.
197. Masters, Mates and Pilots, 842 F.2d at 71.
198. Id. at 73. It was estimated that only 10% of the union's membership was negatively affected by the regulation.
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regulation did not operate to the advantage of an entrenched leadership. 199 The court also noted that no irregularities beyond members' control, such as seasonal employment, made it too difficult for members to
meet the bylaw's requirement. 2°° In essence, the court examined three
indicia of the regulation's effect on the democratic election process and,
seeing very little negative effect, upheld the regulation.2 1
In Aluminum Workers, where one of six members were disqualified
from seeking office and voting because they failed to pay strike assessment fees, at least one indicia of effect-the percentage of potential candidates eliminated from the pool-was at least twice as great as in
Masters, Mates and Pilots. 20 2 As in Masters, Mates and Pilots, it is not
clear from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion which interests the union specifically argued that the regulation was aimed to serve.2 "3 No time period
was operative within the bylaw, eliminating any argument that it was
designed to protect the union's interest in ensuring candidates' familiarity
with union issues. 2 4 The union did have, however, a financial stake in
conducting its internal affairs.20 5 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit ignored that interest and instead focused on the issue of notice.20 6 The
court stated that because members should have known by reading a copy
of the union's constitution that their failure to pay strike assessment dues
could detrimentally effect their ability to run for union office, the bylaw
was reasonable.20 7
The Aluminum Workers decision is disturbing because, in essence, the
Eleventh Circuit held that notice by publication may be sufficient to save
a bylaw despite its antidemocratic effects.20 8 In Aluminum Workers,
where less than 20% of the membership was adversely affected, notice of
the requirement did save the regulation. Whether publication might save
a regulation with a larger impact on the union election process is open to
question.
Both courts' holdings seem inconsistent with the majority of court interpretations of section 401(e) as well as the LMRDA's legislative history, which indicates that elections in this country must serve as a model
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
Union,
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 178-14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See generally Department of Labor v. Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers' Int'l
Local 200, 941 F.2d 1172, 1177-91 (11th Cir. 1991).
Id.
See supra notes 112 and 116.
See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
Brick & Glass Workers, 941 F.2d at 1177.
Id.
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for union elections.2" 9 Beyond a union's interests in its own finances and
ensuring informed candidates-the latter of which have never been upheld by the courts-no other interests justified the regulations' antidemocratic effects. 2 10 No analogous constitutional provisions deal with
preserving the nation's fiscal integrity through the election process.
Other constitutional provisions do deal with the subject of fiscal integrity,
however, and it is significant that these provisions appear in wholly separate sections of the Constitution.2 1 ' Preserving the nation's fiscal integrity, paralleling a union's fiscal integrity, according to our nation's
Founders, apparently had nothing to do with conducting democratic
elections.
Citizens of the United States do not lose their eligibility to run for office for failure to pay their income taxes; likewise, a union member
should not be excluded from running for office for failure to pay strike
assessment or other types of union dues-if United States elections are
used as the model.2 12 If union elections are to be conducted under the
same principles as those in the United States, as stated by the Supreme
Court in Hotel Employees, then union members in choosing who they
want to run their union will consider whether or not a candidate has paid
all of his or her union dues-just as citizens of the United States weigh
whether or not a candidate owes taxes to the government.2 13 In short,
considering existing Supreme Court precedent along with congressional
intent in enacting Title IV of the LMRDA, there appears to be no persuasive justification for either the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Aluminum
21 5
Workers2" 4 or the Fourth Circuit's holding in Masters, Mates and Pilots.
3. Management Applications: What Value Undivided Loyalty?
In Postal Workers2 16 and Letter Carriers, the same argument was pos209. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
210. Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 311 (1977).
211. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 2, 3. These sections of the Constitution speak to
Congress' power to impose and collect taxes, borrow money and regulate commerce. Id.
212. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
213. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S. 492, 504 (1968).
As Justice Brennan stated: "Congress' model of democratic elections was political elections
in this country .... [T]he assumption is that voters will exercise common sense and judgment in casting their ballots." Id.
214. Department of Labor v. Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers Int'l Union, Local
200, 941 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1991).
215. Brock v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 842 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir.
1988).
216. McLaughlin v. American Postal Workers Union, 680 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla.
1988).
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ited by the unions in support of the regulation.2 1 7 In those cases, the
unions argued that the regulation at issue was reasonable because the
unions had a legitimate interest in ensuring that candidates for union office had no divided loyalties stemming from their application for a management job within the past two years. 218 Ensuring loyalty in a union is a
goal analogous to the constitutional provision requiring that a candidate
for President be a natural-born citizen. 219 Therefore, the Founders considered a citizenship requirement to be a reasonable requirement for a
candidate for President-one that rather than impeding democracy
within the country might actually foster a more representative
government.
Analogously, union regulations prohibiting candidates from applying
for management positions may be sustained on grounds that the requirements are modeled after elections in this country. 220 The union is seeking
to protect an interest that was considered by the Founders to be a reasonable qualifier for the office of President. Moreover, in the often contentious area of labor-management relations, few would argue against the
proposition that unions have an extremely strong interest in ensuring that
all elected members-from the union steward to the union presidenthave undivided loyalties.22 1
Arguing in the alternative, however, there is no requirement that a person be a natural-born citizen to run for senator or representative. For
whatever reason-perhaps the fact that legislators have less unilateral
opportunity to wield power than does the President-the Founders were
not so concerned that senators and representatives pass the same undivided loyalty test. One might analogize based on these requirements,
therefore, that in the environment of union elections, the bylaws' two217. Martin v. Branch 419, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 965 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1992).
218. See supra notes 131, 138 and accompanying text.
219. The citizenship provision was written into Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the
Constitution to ensure that the leader of the United States would be clearly undivided. See
supra notes 131, 138 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
221. Letter Carriers,965 F.2d at 66 (quoting Brock v. Cincinnati Area Local Am. Postal
Workers Union, No. C-1-85-1215, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17579 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 1988)).
The Sixth Circuit quoted the Cincinnati Area Local court as saying:
"It is axiomatic that [union officials] ... must maintain the appearance that they
are dealing justly. In the sensitive area of labor negotiations and representations,
it is essential that the officers of defendant maintain the appearance of absolute
loyalty and devotion to their constituents, to the end that when a settlement or
other course of action is suggested to the constituent by the officer, the constituent has every assurance that the settlement or suggestions are made in his or her
best interests."
Id. (quoting Cincinnati Area Local, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17579 at *5-*6).
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year requirement reaches too far. Countering this argument, however, is
the strong, demonstrable union interest in undivided representation at all
levels of a union representation.22 2 The Founders identified such a risk in
the office of President. A union's interest in undivided loyalties, however, like the nation's interest in ensuring a loyal President, are at least
somewhat analogous.
4.

Retiree Restrictions: UnreasonableMaximums

223
In declining to enforce maximum age ceilings in Sheet Metal Workers
22 4
and American Federation,
the courts' rulings that union bylaws not be
22 5
given broad reach
were consistent with Steelworkers.226 To outweigh
the regulations' restrictive effect on democracy within the union, the unions had to assert a strong union interest.2 27 In both cases, the records
are devoid of persuasive reasoning.22 8
The United States Constitution does not explicitly mention maximum
age ceilings for any office. Appropriately, the Constitution left it in the
hands of voters to determine whether or not a candidate is too old to be
elected to federal office. Similarly, the election procedures established
under the LMRDA also leave age considerations to the thoughtful consideration of union members. 229 The courts correctly decided these cases,
recognizing that an important aspect of the democratic process is the ability to determine which candidates are most qualified to serve in union
office.

5.

No Excuse for a Union Membership Requirement

The interest posited by the union to support the three-year member222. See Cox, supra note 43, at 842 (stating that "[t]he election of officers is the heart of
union democracy"); see also Hartley, supra note 53, at 50 (stating that electing officers is
the essence of union democracy).
223. Donovan v. Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers, 613 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
224. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 715 F. Supp. 1119 (D.D.C.
1989).
225. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 309 (1977).
226. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
227. Steelworkers, 429 U.S. at 313-14.
228. See generally Donovan v. Local 25, Sheet Metal Workers, 613 F. Supp. 607, 608-11
(E.D. Tenn. 1985).
229. In fact, the Department of Labor's regulations note that, in light of the enactment
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-639 (1988), a
union may not "establish a general compulsory retirement age or comparable age restriction on candidacy since this would be inconsistent with [the Act]." 29 C.F.R. § 452.46
(1992).
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ship requirement at issue in Sailors' Union230 was that the requirement
assured that candidates were familiar with union affairs.2 3 ' While it is
possible to analogize the purpose of such a tenure requirement with a
residency or citizenship requirement 23 2 for office within the United States
government, the court rejected the regulation as unreasonable. 233 The
court may have considered that in many ways a membership requirement
impinges the democratic process of a union even more severely than did
the eighteen-month meeting attendance requirement considered in Steelworkers.234 Given the Sailor's Union's bylaw's broad antidemocratic impact,235 and the appeals court's obligation to acknowledge the
Steelworkers Court's "broad reach" analysis, the court appropriately
236
struck down the bylaw.
IV.

A.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Applying an Alternative Means Analysis

Because a union might legitimately argue that it has strong internal
interests in several areas, such as fiscal integrity, establishing a new prong
to the Steelworkers test will further aid unions, the Secretary of Labor,
and the courts in differentiating legitimate interests from those that are
230. Donovan v. Sailors' Union, 739 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir.), corrected, 117 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2512 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
231. Id. at 1429.
232. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
233. Id.; see also supra notes 157-63.
234. For example, although a smaller percentage of members are likely to be negatively
impacted by such a requirement, members lacking the requisite seniority within the union
have no means other than biding their time to satisfy the bylaw. Thus, there is not even an
excuse provision that would allow an informed and concerned union member to
participate.
235. The restriction in Sailors' Union applied to all union officers at the local and international level. Sailors' Union, 739 F.2d at 1430.
236. Although the conclusion of this analysis reaches a result contrary to the constitutional model, it receives support from the recognition that it is not always appropriate to
draw literal parallels between union bylaws and constitutional restrictions. See supra note
165. Rather, it is more appropriate to examine the underlying reasons for the rules. Id.
Here, for example, a union has attempted to impose a three-year membership requirement. See supra note 159. The Constitution requires a citizen to be a resident of the
United States for seven, nine or 14 years, depending upon the importance of the office
sought. See supra notes 166-71. By its very words, such restrictions are deemed reasonable
constitutional requirements and, implicitly, requiring a more extended period of citizenship
would be unreasonable. The justification for the rule becomes less clear. Similarly, the
justification behind a stringent union membership requirement also begins to dissipate
where the rule's antidemocratic effect outweighs its purpose of guaranteeing candidates
who are in touch with the concerns of the union electorate. Therefore, the issue is not
whether a union can regulate this area and protect its interest in having informed officers;
rather, it is to what extent the area may be regulated.
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not legitimate. An alternative means test, for example, might be useful in
analyzing the union interest posited before it is weighed on the Steelworkers balance against its potential detrimental effect on union democracy.
No court, prior to or since the decision in Steelworkers, has applied an
alternative means test in judging the reasonableness of union regulations.
Doing so could bring consistency to this area of the law as well as eventually result in reducing the number of challenges brought under section
402(e). For example, the union in Masters, Mates and Pilots2 3 7 at least
implicitly proffered an interest in its own fiscal integrity. 23 8 Although the
court of appeals gave the union bylaw broader reach than the Steelworkers Court applied to a meeting attendance requirement, the regulation
would not have survived an alternative means analysis. The union's interest in Masters, Mates and Pilots in ensuring that quarterly union dues
were paid is clearly important. 239 Equally clear, however, is that this interest could be preserved and protected in many ways that would have
had less negative impact on the goals established by Congress in enacting
240
section 401(e) -preserving and protecting union democracy.
For example, other methods could be utilized by a union to sanction a
member who has not paid his or her union dues. Most efficacious might
be imposing fines on delinquent union members. Striking at a member's
pocketbook is likely to be even more efficacious in securing this important union interest because most members will never have any interest in
running for union office. Similarly, there are means other than meeting
attendance requirements through which a union could ensure that candidates are informed about union business and issues. For example, a
union could require that a member, once elected, attend a training seminar or special classes that update newly elected officers on issues of special importance.
In contrast, a union's interest in ensuring undivided loyalties would
likely survive the alternative means analysis. For example, requiring future candidates to sign a loyalty oath as an alternative to banning those
who sought management positions from holding union office for a specified period of time might be considered inadequate. A union could argue
237. Brock v. International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 842 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
238. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
239. One commentator labels the good standing rules "vital" not only to protect a
union's economic interest but also to protect the "union from an influx of new voters and
neophyte candidates who are unfamiliar with the nature and functioning of the union."
Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry Into Title IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV.
336, 341 (1968).
240. See generally supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. Indeed, as one commentator points out, the danger of restrictive rules arises as it is used by the union's leadership to
"limit opposition and maintain the incumbents in office." Note, supra note 239, at 341.
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that a loyalty oath-in light of the real potential for accusations from
members that their interests are not adequately protected, or that a union
representative is not adequately committed to the members he or she
serves-would fall short of achieving the intended goals. Having survived an alternative means test, the union's interest in preserving the integrity of its leadership is balanced against the bylaw's potentially
detrimental effect on democratic elections.
Overall, utilizing an alternative means test could have the effect of reducing the number of suits brought by union members through the Secretary of Labor by narrowing the categories of legitimate interests unions
can cite in support of restrictive regulations. Creating a more stringent
test is consistent with Justice Brennan's command that union bylaws not
be given broad reach by federal court judges. Hence, it would more adequately serve the goal that section 401(e) was enacted to protect-preserving union democracy.
B. A ProhibitionAgainst Burden Shifting
241
Justice Brennan stated in Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery
that a bylaw must be judged "not by the burden it imposes on the individual candidate but by its effect on free and democratic processes of union
government., 242 As demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Brock v. InternationalOrganizationof Masters, Mates & Pilots,243 as well
as the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Department of Labor v. Aluminum,
Brick & Glass Workers International Union, Local 200,244 some lower
courts have ignored the Supreme Court's command. Instead of solely
weighing the provision's detrimental effect on union democracy in the
first instance, they have shifted at least part of the burden to complaining
union members to demonstrate that they could not have easily met the
bylaw's requirements.24 5
In Masters, Mates and Pilots,246 the court noted a lack of seasonal obstacles that might have led to high unemployment in the industry and,
consequently, made it more difficult for members to make quarterly dues

241. 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
242. Id. at 311 n.6.
243. 842 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
244. 941 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1991).
245. See generally Barnard, supra note 40, at 1275-78. Barnard's pre-Steelworkers analysis also cites this as an area of difficulty enmeshing the Secretary of Labor. Id. Barnard
suggests that the Secretary "could shift his emphasis.., by transferring the burden of proof
to the unions to justify their qualifications, and.., he could insist that the union demonstrate that the limitation imposed is consistent with those for candidates in political elections in this country." Id. at 1275-76.
246. 842 F.2d at 70.
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payments.24 7 In essence, the court was noting that the decision whether
to pay quarterly dues was undertaken by members as individuals. That is,
the bylaw imposed by a union's leadership did not impose an unnecessary
burden on members. 248 Similarly, in Aluminum Workers,24 9 the court
found it dispositive that members had notice of the bylaw's fee
requirement.2 5 °
By considering these factors, the courts of appeals ran afoul of the
Supreme Court's admonition in Steelworkers; it is of no consequence that
prewarned members had the ability or knowledge with which to meet the
bylaw's requirement.25 1 For example, in Steelworkers, every member of
the union with at least eighteen months tenure had the ability to satisfy
the bylaw's requirement that a member attend at least eighteen meetings
within a three-year period leading up to elections.252 By requesting a
copy of the union's constitution, or examining the copy distributed to
them upon becoming a member, each member theoretically would also
have had notice. The Supreme Court in Steelworkers, however, discarded
these saving provisions as irrelevant because of the restrictive effect that
the bylaw, enacted by the union's leadership, had on members' ability to
elect candidates to lead their union.25 3 The Court recognized that a vast
majority of union members are not intimately familiar with every union
bylaw, and thus would not have notice.25 4 The Court explicitly stated that
the onus is on the parties who enacted the provision in the first
instance.25 5
Courts that have considered such saving provisions have essentially
placed the onus on a member's reaction to the restrictive bylaw. By doing so, these courts accord the regulation a much broader reach than the
247. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
249. 941 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir. 1991).
250. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
251. See also Barnard, supra note 40, at 1276. Examining the literal phrasing of 29
U.S.C. § 401(e) (1988), Barnard notes that:
The basic right guaranteed by the phrase is the right of a member to be a candidate and to hold office, and not the right of the union to impose qualifications. It
follows that any union asserting an exception to that right should have the burden
of showing that ...its own peculiar interest is greater than the preservation of the
democratic ideal embodied in the basic right.
Barnard, supra note 40, at 1276.
252. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
255. Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 310-11 & n.6 (1977) (stating that the eligibility rule is to be judged "not by the burden it imposes on the individual
candidate but by its effect on free and democratic processes of union government").
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Supreme Court in Steelworkers stated should be permitted.25 6 In Steelworkers, the Supreme Court indicated that the union's leadership should
not have enacted overly severe restrictions in the first instance. 257 It is

irrelevant whether or not members could have met the bylaws requirements in a latter instance.
The Supreme Court in Steelworkers, interpreting section 401(e), correctly placed the burden upon the union to prove that the bylaw at issue
was not restrictive. 258 Future courts should refrain from endorsing the
type of burden-shifting engaged in by the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits to
ensure more consistent rulings and to ensure that section 401(e)'s goal of
democratic union elections is met.
V.

CONCLUSION

The test struck by the Supreme Court in Steelworkers effectively serves
the LMRDA's goal of preserving society's and union members' interests
in maintaining democratic unions. It also affords unions sufficient autonomy to conduct their own internal affairs as long as union regulations do
not unreasonably interfere with the goal of conducting democratic union
elections.
Courts most often have struck the balance in favor of upholding a
union bylaw when it is enacted to safeguard what is considered a union's
core interest within our labor-management system. This is appropriate.
Utilizing an alternative means test would further promote this purposeconsistent with Steelworkers as well as Congress' intent in enacting section 401(e). The result would be a more consistent pattern of rulings
from federal courts, benefitting society as a whole and unions themselves.
Unions would more readily discern a clearly delineated line drawn by the
federal courts and the Department of Labor, a line over which they
should not tread without risk of triggering a challenge.
Patrick R. Plummer

256. See Barnard, supra note 40, at 1276.
257. Id. "[This] approach tends to lose sight of the member's basic right to seek and
hold office." Id.
258. In addition, as noted by one author, placing the burden on the union "is consistent
with well-recognized tenets of statutory construction." See Beaird, supra note 41, at 1319.
For example, as a general rule, the right to run for union office should be open to all
members unless specifically excluded. Id. "Exceptions in remedial statutes are narrowly
construed, so as to give effect to the main objective of the legislation, and a party has the
burden of plainly bringing himself within the terms of the exception." Id.

